Cultures of simulations vs. cultures of calculations: A look at Sundberg 2010
One of the most interesting, and perhaps personally resonant, papers I’ve ever come across is by Mikaela Sundberg (2010) and is called “Cultures of simulations vs. cultures of calculations? The development of simulation practices in meteorology and astrophysics".
The two cultures named in the title refers to two different approaches to numerical modeling and simulation in science. The paper looks at characteristics of these two culture in astrophysics and meteorology, and finds some differences. To explain what characterices the two cultures, I think I’ll just quote the paper:
The culture of calculation is modern and characterized by linearity, logic and depth, and there is a promise to explain, unpack, reduce and clarify its outcomes (Turkle, 1995). For the computer considered as a calculator, this means that what happens inside it can be (mechanically) unpacked. If we apply this conceptualization of the modern to numerical simulation activities it implies developers/constructors who build their codes by and for themselves. When analyzing the outcomes of simulations, they unpack the computer programs to reach the underlying mathematical model.
Postmodern culture of simulation is fluid, decentered, and opaque and search for mechanisms and depth is futile (Turkle, 1995). The boundary between the virtual and the real is eroded, both in everyday life and in scientific fields. We can simulate nature in a program or build second natures where the objects visualized on the screen have no simple physical referent (cf. Helmreich, 1998). Images have been highlighted as a crucial aspect of postmodern society and visualization is one of the major themes in Turkle’s (2009) more recent collection of essays on simulation practices. However, Frigg and Reiss (2009) note that visual representations are not particular to simulations and that dynamic (such as cinematic) representations, contain exactly the same information as a (static) table or plot, but that the former may be easier grasp. They dismiss this special feature of simulations from the realm of philosophical interest, yet there might be sociological implications and consequences worth discussing. For example, the presentation of visual material in the form of animations compared to discussion of equations can be regarded as manifestations of the distinction between surface (culture of simulation) and depth (culture of calculations). Do animations invite us to look, rather than think (cf. Jin, 2008: 147)? Are they entertaining rather than evidential and as such serving to seduce scientists to overestimate the credibility of simulations (cf. Baudrillard, [1970] 1998; Lahsen, 2005; Turkle, 2009)?
Importantly, Turkle (1995) emphasizes the shift from programming to use of computer programs which took place from the 1970s through the 1990s and she describes the user as someone seduced by the interface and involved with the machine in a hands-on and applied way, not interested in why technology works, but only that it works.3 Because such a shift from construction and development (“depth”) of simulation codes, involving writing equations, adding new modules, coding, programming etc., to use (“surface”) as black-boxes without paying much attention to the inside is a basis for cultures of simulation to evolve, it is of elementary importance to take it as a starting point for analyzing the work with simulations codes in science too.
Moreover, a postmodern approach implies playful exploration at the interface rather than serious, in-depth investigation (cf. Jameson, 1984). Play in the common sense meaning used here refers to engagement in activities for enjoyment, rather than for serious or practical purposes. Thus, the dichotomy seriousness/play characterizes the modern vs. the postmodern. Yet from a sociological viewpoint, play is commonly regarded as a part of socialization (see e.g. Mead, 1934). To distinguish among the modern and the postmodern I therefore draw upon Baudrillard to propose that they are characterized by different playful attitudes. Baudrillard ([1970] 1998: 114) refers to passion as a playful attitude consisting of sincere desire and a concrete relation to an object which implies total investment and intense symbolic value, whereas the playful attitude of mere curiosity is more volatile and characteristic of the consumer (postmodern) society. If contemporary culture is marked by preference for extremes (Baudrillard, ([1970] 1998; cf. Bogard, 1990), extremeness might be required to create curiosity. For modelers, such a preference would imply that they no longer seek to generate simulation output that appears reasonable in relation to the real world (cf. also Turkle, 2009: 56f.), but amuse themselves with extreme, rather than reasonable, scenarios instead.
To summarize, cultures of simulation and cultures of calculation can be characterized by the dichotomies surface/depth, play/seriousness, and finally, extreme/reasonable. They are used to discuss how these “cultures” exist side by side as manifested in different simulation activities and situations, not as characterizing whole fields or generations of scientists. However, indications of shifts in emphasis over time can be observed.